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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, acts of terrorism and an increasingly unstable 
global economy have resulted in increased emphasis on national 
security.1 In order to achieve a higher level of security, U.S. citizens 
have suffered the consequences of more aggressive and invasive 
security measures.2 While most U.S. citizens would probably agree 
that they would sacrifice some individual liberties in the name of 
security, where will the line be drawn?3 
As national security plays a larger role in our daily lives, U.S. law 
enforcement officers man the front lines in keeping our cities and 
communities safe.4 Recently, however, police across the country have 
                                                                                                                 
 1. For example, eleven days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the White House 
appointed the first Director of Homeland Security to “overs[ee] and coordinate[] a comprehensive national 
strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism and . . . future attacks.” Creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., http://www.DHS.gov/Creation-Department-Homeland-
Security (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). One year later, in November 2002, Congress created the Department 
of Homeland Security with the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which sought to “reduce 
the vulnerability of . . . [and] ensure . . . the overall economic security of the United States.” Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101(a)(1)(B), (F), 116 Stat. 2135, 2142, (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 2. See Siobhan Gorman, Spy Agency Activities Violated Fourth Amendment Rights, Letter Discloses, 
WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044409790457753941313 
7490028.html (discussing a “secret national security court[‘s]” ruling that the National Security Agency 
has conducted “spy activities [that] on at least one occasion have violated the Fourth Amendment”). This 
article further discussed extensions to the Patriot Act that allow the use of “broad search warrants that 
permit eavesdropping [on] categories of people . . . rather [than] requiring warrants for individual people.” 
Id. 
 3. In a Gallup Poll conducted in August 2011, 71% of Americans believed that “the government 
should take steps to prevent additional acts of terrorism but not if those steps would violate [their] basic 
civil liberties.” Civil Liberties, GALLUP, http://www.Gallup.com/Poll/5263/Civil-Liberties.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2014). In comparison, 25% of Americans stated that “the government should take all steps 
necessary to prevent additional acts of terrorism in the U.S. even if it means [their] basic civil liberties 
would be violated,” while 4% had no opinion on the matter. Id. Despite the poll’s findings, the continuing 
public outrage since Edward Snowden revealed information concerning the United States’ spy operations 
suggests that a large number of U.S. citizens are not willing to give up their privacy in the name of national 
security. See Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US Spy Programme, BBC WORLD NEWS (Jan. 17, 
2014, 9:56 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964. 
 4. The mission statements for police departments across the country generally seek to “safeguard the 
lives and property of the people” they serve and to work with “communities to improve their quality of 
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become “increasingly militarized.”5 Local police forces now arm 
themselves with military equipment6 (e.g., armored personnel carriers 
that fire .50 caliber rounds,7 helicopters, and amphibious tanks)8 with 
the authorization and at the expense of the federal government.9 
While spotting the traditional arms expansion of power amongst our 
law enforcement agencies is easy, the non-traditional expansion—the 
increasing use of covert technology and furtive tactics—is not so 
apparent. Police departments have begun to test the constitutional 
limits of their actions,10 employing techniques “once reserved for 
overseas intelligence . . . to domestic criminal investigations.”11 
                                                                                                                 
life.” The Mission Statement of the LAPD, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.LAPDOnline.org/Inside_ 
The_LAPD/content_basic_view/844 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014); e.g., Mission Statement, ATLANTA 
POLICE DEP’T, http://www.Atlantapd.org/Mission.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (whose mission seeks 
to “ensur[e] the safety of our citizens and build[] trust in partnership with our community”); Mission, 
N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/mission.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2014) (whose mission seeks to “enhance the quality of life in our City” and “provide for a safe 
environment”); Chicago Police Department’s Mission, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, https://portal.chicagopolice. 
org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/About%20CPD/Our%20Mission (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (noting that 
the Chicago Police Department is “part of, and empowered by, the community . . . to protect”). 
 5. Erik Kain, Police Militarization in the Decade Following 9/11, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2011, 11:01 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/09/12/police-militarization-in-the-decade-following-
911/. 
 6. See Benjamin F. Carlson, Battlefield Main Street, BENJAMIN F. CARLSON (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://benjaminfcarlson.com/?p=396 (noting that orders for surplus military equipment under the 
government’s 1033 program in 2012 increased “400 percent over the same period in 2011”). Under the 
1033 program, the Department of Defense authorizes the transfer of excess military equipment to local 
law enforcement departments. Id. 
 7. Radley Balko, Sheriff Lott’s New Toy, HIT & RUN BLOG (Sept. 1, 2008, 1:12 PM), 
http://Reason.com/blog/2008/09/01/sheriff-lotts-new-toy. 
 8. Carlson, supra note 6. 
 9. The National Defense Authorization Act allows the Department of Defense to transfer excess 
personal property to support law enforcement activities. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 2576a, 110 Stat. 2422, 2639 (1996) (codified as amended at scattered 
sections of U.S.C.). Under the program, “the Secretary of Defense may transfer . . . arms and ammunition, 
that the Secretary determines [are] . . . suitable for use by the agencies in law enforcement activities . . . 
and . . . excess to the needs of the Department of Defense.” National Defense Authorization Act, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 2576a(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). In addition, the program allows the law enforcement agencies to receive the 
property “without charge[,]” only having to reimburse the Department of Defense for charges associated 
with the transfer. Id. § 2576a(b)–(c). 
 10. Compare United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 952–53 (2012) (finding an unreasonable 
search where police obtained evidence against the defendant through the use of a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) that they attached to the defendant’s car after their warrant had expired), with United States 
v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–79 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that police did not violate defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment protections when they tracked his location using his cell phone, reasoning that the same 
information could have been obtained through visual surveillance), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013) 
(mem.). 
 11. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Patriot Act: The Kitchen-Sink Approach to National Security, N.Y. 
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One area in which law enforcement agencies have stretched 
constitutional limits concerns the scope of a suspect’s consent to 
search his or her vehicle.12 Police forces across the country have tested 
the limits of consent by asking vague, conversational questions to 
suspects with the goal of obtaining a suspect’s consent to search, even 
though that individual may not want to allow the search or may not 
know that he or she has the right to deny consent.13 Conversational 
phrases like “Can I take a quick look?”14 or “Can I take a quick look 
around?”15 have “emerg[ed] as . . . a regular part of police jargon.”16 
When people answer these questions in the affirmative—thus 
consenting to a search—courts have diverged on the question of what 
people have actually agreed to.17 Have they given up any right at all? 
Or, have they just consented to a full search? Part I of this Note will 
describe the history of consent and its interplay with the U.S. 
Constitution.18 Part II will then examine and analyze how courts have 
interpreted the scope of consent in a variety of “conversational consent 
search” cases.19 Finally, Part III will analyze a variety of potential 
solutions to the issues conversational consent searches present and 
ultimately propose that courts should adopt a narrow interpretation of 
the search scope granted by a conversational consent.20 
                                                                                                                 
MAG. (Aug. 27, 2011), http://nymag.com/news/9-11/10th-anniversary/patriot-act/. 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 13. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While knowledge of the right to 
refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge 
as the sine qua non of an effective consent.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Wald, 216 F.3d at 1225. 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 16. Dru Stevenson, Consenting to “Quick Look” Police Searches, CIRCUIT SPLITS (Apr. 8, 2012, 3:21 
PM), http://www.CircuitSplits.com/2012/04/Consenting-To-Quick-Look-Police-Searches.html#more. 
 17. Compare United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667–68 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
consent to “‘look in’” an automobile “is the equivalent of a . . . general consent to search”), with Wald, 
216 F.3d at 1228 (holding that when defendant allowed the officer “‘to take a quick look inside the 
vehicle’” the “‘consent did not go any further than the interior of the vehicle’” (quoting the district court)). 
 18. See discussion infra Part I. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II. 
 20. See discussion infra Part III. 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss4/7
2014] THE CONVERSATIONAL CONSENT SEARCH 1081 
I.   BACKGROUND 
A.   The Origins of Consent Law 
In the United States criminal justice system, the idea of an individual 
consenting to a search by a law enforcement officer stems from the 
“interplay” of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.21 The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause.”22 Meanwhile, the pertinent portion of the 
Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”23 Much debate has 
surrounded the definition of a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, 
the intricacies of which fall outside the scope of this note.24 However, 
courts have developed a much clearer definition of a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.25 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court stated that 
a seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show 
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”26 
On its face, the Fourth Amendment does not impose a requirement 
that a warrant be issued whenever a government official performs a 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947) (per curiam). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 
455 (1948) (noting that the Constitution contains a warrant requirement “so that an objective mind might 
weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law”). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 24. The modern-day definition of a search under the Fourth Amendment comes from the seminal case 
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347. While Katz did not provide a bright line rule, the majority opinion 
stated “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Id. at 351. Perhaps the more well-known and 
applied test came from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(noting that people have a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy” (emphasis 
added)). 
 25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). 
 26. Id.; see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (“A person is seized by the police 
and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘by 
means of physical force or show of authority,’ terminates or restrains his freedom of movement . . . .” 
(quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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search,27 and courts have long recognized situations in which police 
do not need a warrant to conduct a search.28 
One of the most widely recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement—and the one at the heart of “quick look” police 
searches—is the voluntary consent search.29 Courts first applied the 
voluntary consent principle in 1946.30 In early opinions on the issue, 
the Supreme Court validated police searches based on one’s voluntary 
consent, reasoning that an individual had knowingly waived a 
“constitutional right.”31 As more consent cases progressed through the 
courts, however, the Supreme Court shifted gears—now holding that 
individuals need not know that they are abandoning a legal right in 
order for consent to be valid.32 This premise justified a new theory—
                                                                                                                 
 27. The plain meaning of the text implies that warrants are not necessary in the event the police 
perform a reasonable search or seizure. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This seems to be the foundation for 
the many exceptions to the warrant rule, which include the following: 
 
investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizures of 
items in plain view, searches and seizures justified by exigent circumstances, consent 
searches, searches of vehicles, searches of containers, inventory searches, border searches, 
searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the special needs of law 
enforcement make the probable cause and warrant requirements impracticable. 
 
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 37, 37–38 (2006). 
 28. See Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 27, at 37–38. For example, it is “well 
established” that courts have long accepted searches and seizures by police “without a warrant” of items 
in plain view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 
128, 128–29 (1990) (noting that, in order for a plain view search to be valid, the officer (1) must have a 
legal right to “arriv[e] at the place” where (2) the item can be “plainly viewed” and (3) the “incriminating 
character” of the item is “‘immediately apparent’” (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466)). Among other 
exceptions, courts also allow searches incident to lawful arrest. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762–63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person 
arrested . . . . Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.”). 
 29. See Christo Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1171, 1171–
72 & n.2 (2007) (“State actors rely on consent to search more than any other basis to justify a governmental 
intrusion on Fourth Amendment protections . . . .”). 
 30. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (holding that when “petitioner . . . specifically 
agreed to permit inspection . . . , he voluntarily waived such claim to privacy which he otherwise might 
have had”), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947) (per curiam). As discussed in the remainder of the section, 
however, courts no longer analyze voluntary consent searches on the basis of waiver but rather the 
“reasonableness” portion of the Fourth Amendment. See discussion, infra notes 31–33 and accompanying 
text. 
 31. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (noting that petitioner could only waive a 
constitutional right through “word or deed” and emphasizing the fact that an individual needs to know 
that he is giving up a legal right in order to waive it). 
 32. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996) (adding that there is no requirement that officers 
inform a seized person that he has the right to refuse a search); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
6
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one other than waiver—to support consent searches. Accordingly, 
courts now hold that voluntary consent searches are constitutional 
because the consent search is a “reasonable” search.33 
B.   Modern Day Consent Law 
While courts first recognized voluntary consent in 1946, they did 
not lay out more stringent guidelines until 1973 when the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided a landmark consent case, Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte.34 In Schneckloth, the defendant was charged with 
possession of a check with intent to defraud.35 Police found the 
evidence that formed the basis for the charge—three “[w]added up” 
checks—during a consent search of a vehicle in which the defendants 
were riding.36 The “precise question” that the court decided was “what 
must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that a consent was 
‘voluntarily’ given.”37 As the court put it, voluntariness has “no 
talismanic definition[,]”38 but rather in determining voluntariness one 
should look at “the totality of all the circumstances.”39 Some of the 
factors that courts should weigh in determining voluntariness are: 
(1) knowledge of the constitutional right to refuse consent; (2) age, 
intelligence, education, and language ability; (3) the degree to 
which the individual cooperates with the police; (4) the 
individual’s attitude about the likelihood of the discovery of 
contraband; and (5) the length of detention and the nature of 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
 33. E.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990) (analyzing the consent issue on the ground 
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment). The idea of “reasonableness” comes from the language 
of the Fourth Amendment itself. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172. 
 34. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218. 
 35. Id. at 219. 
 36. Id. at 220. The appellate court in the case stated that whether a suspect voluntarily offers his or her 
consent is a “‘question of fact to be determined in light of all the circumstances.’” Id. at 221 (quoting 
People v. Michael, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (Cal. 1955)). 
 37. Id. at 223. 
 38. Id. at 224 (stating that voluntariness “cannot be taken literally to mean a ‘knowing’ choice. ‘Except 
where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all 
incriminating statements—even those made under brutal treatment—are “voluntary” in the sense of 
representing a choice of alternatives’”). 
 39. Id. at 227. 
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questioning, including the use of physical punishment or other 
coercive police behavior.40 
Since Schneckloth, courts have continued to tailor the requirements 
necessary to show that an officer obtained valid, voluntary consent 
from a suspect.41 In addition to the voluntariness requirement outlined 
above, courts have required that the consent come from a person with 
“actual”42 or “apparent”43 authority to give consent. Also—and the 
most important requirement for the purpose of this note—to be 
constitutional, an officer’s search “may not legally exceed the scope 
of the consent supporting it.”44 Furthermore, courts will imply consent 
from “the circumstances surrounding the search, by the person’s prior 
actions or agreements, or by the person’s failure to object to the 
search.”45 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 27, at 81–84 (also noting that “[n]o single factor 
is dispositive” and that “the influence of drugs, intoxication, and mental agitation do not render consent 
involuntary”). 
 41. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250–51 (1991); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 
188 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
 42. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 168–69. 
 43. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 194 n.1. Rodriguez held in part that the “determination of consent . . . must 
‘be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment . . . “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief”’ that the consenting party had authority 
over the premises?” Id. at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)) (second alteration in 
original). 
 44. United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 382 (8th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court determined that 
the permissible scope of a warrantless automobile search “is defined by the object of the search and the 
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 824 (1982); see Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 382 (finding the officer did not exceed the scope of consent 
where he asked if he may look inside the trunk of the car, and after examining, he moved to the passenger 
area of the car without objection from defendant); see also Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; Walter v. United 
States, 447 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1980). 
 45. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, supra note 27, at 88. However, the “failure to object” 
exception only applies to general consent searches and not to limited consent searches, such as when an 
individual allows an officer to search one particular compartment or area. See, e.g., United States v. 
Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We consistently and repeatedly have held a defendant’s 
failure to limit the scope of a general authorization to search, and failure to object when the search exceeds 
what he later claims was a more limited consent, is an indication the search was within the scope of 
consent.”). 
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C.   The Voluntary Consent Search and its Relevance to 
Conversational Consent Searches 
Ever since courts have recognized the voluntary consent theory as 
an exception to the warrant requirement, law enforcement officers 
have made often use of it.46 The reasons for the vast increase in 
voluntary consent searches have been widely addressed. In general, the 
popularity of these searches stems from the fact that “consent is so 
easily obtained,” and consent searches afford officers “the depth and 
breadth of the search” that they want.47 Adding to the problem, most 
people do not know that they have the right to refuse consent and—
unlike the attendant Fifth Amendment48—under the Fourth 
Amendment, people need not know of their right to refuse consent in 
order for it to be voluntary.49 As demonstrated in Schneckloth, a 
person’s knowledge of the right to refuse is just one factor used to 
determine voluntariness.50 
Many legal theorists present other viable reasons for the widespread 
use of consent searches. One such argument points out that studies 
have shown that people feel pressure to consent when in the face of 
authority.51 One study demonstrated that in certain circumstances 
“very little pressure is needed to induce innocent people to confess” to 
something that they did not do.52 During the study: 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172 n.2 (“Empirical studies do not exist, and cannot exist, to 
support this proposition; rather, we must rely on common sense and informal, anecdotal reflections of 
individual law enforcement officers from the cop-on-the beat to Transportation Safety Administration 
(TSA) officers at airports to government building authorities, for example.”). 
 47. See id. at 1172. 
 48. In the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court stated that “in-custody interrogation 
of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to 
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so 
freely.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). Accordingly, for a confession to be deemed 
voluntary “the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those 
rights must be fully honored.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 49. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the 
sine qua non of an effective consent.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. 
REV. 153, 172–79 (2002). 
 52. Id. at 178. 
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[R]esearchers brought individual subjects into the laboratory and 
asked them to perform a computer task. Subjects were warned not 
to press the “Alt” key or the computer would crash. At a 
preprogrammed moment, the computer did in fact crash, and the 
experimenter accused the subject of having hit the forbidden key. 
The experimenter then asked the subject to sign a written 
confession stating, “I hit the ‘Alt’ key and caused the program to 
crash. Data were lost.” . . . A total of 69% of subjects signed the 
confession, admitting to a transgression that they did not in fact 
commit.53 
While results like this seem wholly illogical, the same can be said of 
the countless number of defendants in criminal cases who voluntarily 
consent to searches knowing that they have illegal substances or 
contraband in their possession. 
D.   What Does This Mean for You and Me? 
The idea of voluntary consent is at the heart of quick look and 
conversational consent searches.54 As people consent to conversational 
search requests by police officers—for whatever reason—the scope of 
their consent is not abundantly clear. Does their conversational consent 
allow an officer to search for five minutes or two hours? Just in the 
trunk of the car or in the passenger section as well? Inside containers 
or just what is in plain view? The list could go on-and-on and that is 
precisely the problem with these conversational or quick look 
searches; no clear boundaries exist. 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. While an admission in the “Alt key” scenario does not carry the same consequences of 
admission in a criminal context, various other studies and scenarios Nadler mentions carry equally grave 
consequences. Id. at 174. For instance, Nadler describes a phenomenon known as “‘captainitis’”; members 
of the crew notice that a pilot made a mistake, yet they fail to correct or mention the mistake “because 
they convince themselves that if the captain has decided to do it, it must be right.” Id. Ultimately, plane 
crashes have occurred because of this phenomenon. Id. Crew members aboard an airplane would likely 
know the serious consequences of a pilot mistake exceed—or at the very least parallel—the severity of an 
admission in the criminal context. 
 54. Throughout the Note I will use the terms “quick look search” and “conversational consent search” 
to refer to a police officer’s conversational or misleading request for voluntary consent to search a 
suspect’s vehicle. The various courts that have heard these types of cases have not yet branded them with 
any label. 
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Accordingly, courts are tasked with examining the surrounding 
circumstances to determine the scope of consent granted. While some 
courts have found that consent to a conversational search request does 
not provide an officer with any investigative tools that he does not 
already have—the ability to perform a plain view search, a search 
incident to lawful arrest, a stop and frisk search, etc.—some courts 
have held that consent to a conversational request to search grants the 
officer a license to perform a full search.55 As individuals’ rights are 
increasingly “trampled”56 by law enforcement agencies, it is important 
for courts to provide a clearer standard by which officers should 
operate. 
II.   TWO VIEWS ON THE SCOPE OF CONSENT GRANTED IN QUICK LOOK 
POLICE SEARCHES 
Courts have taken two differing views on the scope of consent 
granted in quick look type cases.57 The more expansive view provides 
that a suspect’s voluntary consent to a conversational search request 
provides the officer with a general consent to search;58 the more 
restrictive view limits the officer’s ability to search.59 A vast number 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 869 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667–68 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that consent to “‘look in’ a vehicle” 
provides the officer with general consent to search the vehicle); United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 506 
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Espinosa, 
782 F.2d 888, 892–93 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225 
(D. Kan. 2004) (holding that, where defendant consented to the officer’s request to “‘take a look’” in the 
vehicle defendant was driving, defendant had provided the officer with a general consent to search), aff’d, 
441 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 56. Kain, supra note 5. 
 57. Compare United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a “‘quick 
look’” only provides a limited right to search), with Rich, 992 F.2d at 504, 506 (finding that consent to 
“‘have a look in’” defendant’s truck authorized the officer to search luggage located behind the passenger 
seat). 
 58. E.g., United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 59. E.g., Rich, 992 F.2d at 506. In the vast majority of both the expanded and restrictive view cases, 
courts address whether a suspect expressed any hesitation to the search because courts hold that a suspect’s 
“failure to object” to the officer’s search “‘may be considered an indication that the search was within the 
scope of consent.’” United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1368 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Espinosa, 782 
F.2d at 892 (finding in part that, after the police had searched defendant’s motel room, defendant’s 
subsequent failure to object to searching the room’s bathroom demonstrated that the search fell within the 
scope of consent granted when defendant allowed the officers to look in his room)). In United States v. 
Espinosa, the court found that a search by police at a border patrol checkpoint did not exceed the scope 
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of cases in which a defendant argues that an officer exceeded his scope 
of consent occur in the drug possession context.60 In drug possession 
cases where the officer expresses that the “purpose of [his] search is to 
look for drugs or contraband,” a suspect’s consent to the search 
“‘implies that the officer’” is constitutionally permitted to “‘look 
wherever drugs might be hidden.’”61 
A.   Restricted View of Consent 
A minority of quick look type cases have taken the view that consent 
provides a limited ability to search.62 Aside from United States v. 
Wald—the leading restrictive view case—the vast majority of federal 
cases finding that the officer exceeded the scope of consent do so based 
on facts rather than an interpretation of the quick look or 
conversational search request language.63 On the other hand, state 
courts have been much more amenable than federal courts to narrow 
interpretations of consent in quick look or conversational requests to 
search.64 
1.   United States v. Wald 
The leading restrictive view case is United States v. Wald.65 In Wald, 
an officer stationed alongside a highway observed a vehicle—owned 
                                                                                                                 
of consent granted by a defendant where “[d]efendant stood beside his car expressing no concern during 
[a] thorough and systematic search” which “lasted approximately fourteen minutes.” Espinosa, 782 F.2d 
at 892. And “[a]t no time did defendant attempt to retract or narrow his consent” during the search. Id. 
However, this single factor is not conclusive as determining the scope of consent “‘is a question of fact to 
be determined from the totality of the circumstances.’” Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228 (citing Pena, 920 F.2d at 
1514). 
 60. See, e.g., Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d at 665–66 (case involving possession of 150 kilograms of 
marijuana with intent to distribute); Wald, 216 F.3d at 1225 (case involving possession of drug 
paraphernalia and methamphetamine); Pena, 143 F.3d at 1365 (case involving possession of and intent to 
distribute crack cocaine). 
 61. United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Kan. 2004) (quoting United 
States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139, 1146–47 (10th Cir. 2002)), aff’d, 441 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 62. See, e.g., Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228; United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir. 1997); 
Jacobs v. State, 733 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 63. See discussion infra Parts II.A.1–2. 
 64. See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
 65. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1222. 
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by defendant Wald, who was also a passenger in the vehicle—traveling 
down the interstate with a “badly cracked front windshield.”66 The 
officer noted that the two suspects in the vehicle—the driver and 
defendant passenger—were “talkative[,]” “nervous[,]” and had 
“glassy eyes.”67 Furthermore, the officer smelled the odor of burnt 
methamphetamine.68 Based on the circumstances and his suspicion of 
drug trafficking, the officer addressed the driver and the defendant: 
“‘You wouldn’t mind if I take a quick look, would you?’”69 Both 
responded no, and the officer proceeded to perform a “pat-down” 
search of the suspects, revealing two pipes in defendant’s clothes.70 
After the “pat-down” search, the officer proceeded to search the trunk 
of the car without asking for further permission from the defendant.71 
In the trunk, the officer found luggage, an ice chest, and two “torches” 
but also noticed scratch marks on the screws that held the car’s stereo 
speakers in place.72 The scratch marks indicated to the officer that the 
speakers had been removed.73 The officer then removed the speakers 
and discovered two packages containing a substance that later tested 
positive as methamphetamine.74 
The Government argued it had probable cause to search the trunk of 
the vehicle based on the presence of various drug related items in the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 1224. Importantly, the “badly cracked front windshield” constitutes a motor vehicle 
equipment violation under Utah law and justified the officer’s conduct in pulling over the car. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1224–25. 
 68. Id. at 1225. The officer also noticed a bottle of Visine and a road atlas, all of which, “in his 
experience,” are items associated with drug trafficking. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1228. Note that the officer’s question in Wald is basically a “command in the form of a 
question.” William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1016, 1064 (1995) (noting that if an officer “puts his command in the form of a question, consent is 
deemed voluntary and the evidence comes in”). While the utterance made by the officer may not sound 
very harsh out of context, the fact that it comes from the officer during a traffic stop gives the question 
the “‘force’ of a command.” Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts 
and the Question of Intent, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 194 (1986). This has the persuasive effect of eliciting 
a positive response from the listener. Id. 
 70. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1225, 1228. Even though the officer found two pipes on Wald, Wald stated that 
the pipes were not used for smoking illegal drugs. Id. at 1225. 
 71. Id. at 1225. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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car and the defendants’ physical appearance.75 Ultimately, the court 
found no merit in the Government’s probable cause argument.76 
Because the officer did not have probable cause to search the trunk, 
the Government further argued that the defendant and driver consented 
to a full vehicle search when they stated they did not mind if the officer 
took a “quick look.”77 The Government bolstered its argument by 
pointing out that the suspects failed to object to the officer’s search of 
the trunk, which showed that the search must have been within the 
scope of the defendant’s consent.78 However, the court responded that 
the “failure to object” rule from Florida v. Jimeno only applies when 
a suspect first gives the officer a “general authorization to search[,]” 
and the defendant’s consent to a quick look provided a limited 
authorization to search; thus, the Jimeno rule did not apply.79 
The court also noted that, because the officer had (1) already found 
drug paraphernalia on the defendant, (2) told the defendant that he was 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at 1226. 
 76. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228. The court found that probable cause to search the trunk of the vehicle did 
not exist because, under the “common-sense” holding in United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th 
Cir. 1993), “it is unreasonable to believe people smoke [drugs] in the trunks of cars, the mere smell of 
burnt [drugs] does not create the fair probability that the trunk contains [those drugs].” Wald, 216 F.3d at 
1226. 
 77. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228–29. 
 78. Id. at 1228; see also United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We consistently 
and repeatedly have held a defendant’s failure to limit the scope of a general authorization to search, and 
failure to object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a more limited consent, is an indication 
the search was within the scope of consent.”). 
 79. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted); see also Florida v. 
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) (“A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search 
to which he consents.”); Gordon, 173 F.3d at 766. The rule from Wald—that a defendant’s failure to 
object is only a consideration where a suspect provides a general authorization to search—is at odds with 
various other cases, which have interpreted the doctrine to apply to all cases, not just the general 
authorization cases. See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1368 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding an 
officer’s search of the suspect’s hotel room bathroom where the suspect replied “‘go ahead’” to officers’ 
request to “‘look in’” the room, and the suspect failed to object when officer entered bathroom); United 
States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 689 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding, when defendant gave general permission 
to search his vehicle, this was deemed to include area under hood in light of absence of objection). At 
best, the view regarding the failure to object rule taken by the court in Wald seems a bit circular. The court 
stated that the failure to object rule only applies when the suspect gives a general authorization to search. 
Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228. However, in determining whether a suspect provided a general or limited 
authorization to search, courts objectively consider the facts of the case, including whether or not the 
suspect objected to the search. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. Therefore, although the failure to object to a 
search is a factor in determining whether a suspect provided a general or limited authorization to search, 
according to Wald, it is only to apply when a suspect gives a general authorization. Wald, 216 F.3d at 
1228. 
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in a “bit of trouble,” and (3) told him and the driver that they “were not 
free to go[,]” the defendant likely believed that he was already under 
arrest and “therefore had no power to prevent the trunk 
search.”80Accordingly, the court in Wald held that a suspect’s consent 
to a conversational search request—in this case allowing the officer to 
take a quick look—only allows an officer to search the inside of the 
vehicle and does not extend to a search of the trunk of the car.81 
2.   Wald Compared With Other Restrictive View Federal Cases 
Aside from Wald, very few federal cases have interpreted a 
suspect’s consent to a conversational search request as a limited 
authorization to search absent a suspect’s objection or other facts 
indicating the consent only extends to a specific area.82 
In United States v. Elliott, the court found that an officer exceeded 
the scope of consent after receiving permission to “look through the 
trunk” in order to “see what . . . [the suspect had] in there.”83 The 
officer subsequently unzipped and looked through one of the bags in 
the trunk.84 The court stated the officer’s conduct went too far in light 
of his statement that he “did not want to look through each item” in the 
trunk and “that he just wanted to see how things were packed.”85 
In applying the objective reasonableness test from Jimeno,86 the 
court found that the conversation between the suspect and officer 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228–29 (internal quotations omitted). 
 81. Id. 
 82. In a more recent case, United States v. Purcell, the court implied that consent to a “quick look” 
authorizes an officer to perform a “cursory sweep.” United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 
2008). While the court did not hold on the quick look language (because the individual, Crist, who 
consented to the quick look later consented to a full search), the court stated that when Crist authorized 
the police to “take a quick look around [defendant’s hotel] room[,]” the police did exactly what Crist had 
“authorized them to do: perform a cursory sweep of the room.” Id. at 957. 
 83. United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 86. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s 
consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”); see also 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (“[D]etermination of consent . . . must ‘be judged against 
an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . “warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief”’ that the consenting party had authority over the premises?” (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968))). 
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“would have conveyed to a reasonable person that [the officer] was 
interested only in visually inspecting the trunk and its contents, and did 
not convey his intent to look into any containers in the trunk.”87 
Accordingly, the act of unzipping and looking through a bag in the 
trunk violated the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights.88 
Similarly, in United States v. Neely, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found the officer exceeded the scope of consent, but in this 
case, the suspect asked the officer if he would like to “‘check’ his 
trunk” for weapons.89 Although the officer subsequently searched the 
passenger area of the car and found a weapon, the court found the 
evidence was inadmissible because the suspect never consented to a 
search of his entire vehicle.90 The court reasoned that, based on the 
suspect’s clear statement limiting the search to the trunk of the vehicle, 
the officer’s subsequent search of the interior of the vehicle fell outside 
the scope of the suspect’s consent.91 
3.   The Restrictive View in State Courts 
While Wald represents one of the relatively few instances in which 
a federal court has construed conversational consent as providing a 
limited authorization to search, state courts have been much more 
amenable to the restrictive view.92 In People v. Baltazar, an Illinois 
Court of Appeals case, a state patrolman pulled over defendant 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Elliott, 107 F.3d at 815; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1(c) (5th ed. 2011) 
(“When a purpose is included in the request, then the consent should be construed as authorizing only that 
intensity of police activity necessary to accomplish the stated purpose.”). 
 88. Elliott, 107 F.3d at 815–16. 
 89. United States v. Neely, 564 F.3d 346, 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 90. Id. at 351, 352–53. 
 91. Id. at 350. Notably, the court also did not find the suspect’s failure to object to the officer’s search 
of the interior of the vehicle sufficient to show that the suspect had expanded the scope of his original 
consent. Id. at 351 (“Because Neely’s original consent did not physically encompass the interior of his 
vehicle, under the specific circumstances of this case, we do not find his silence sufficiently persuasive to 
overcome the limitation he originally placed on the search.”). 
 92. E.g., Jacobs v. State, 733 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Rodriguez v. State, 539 So. 
2d 513, 513–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that, where the officer received permission from the 
suspect to “‘look’ into the car[,]” the officer exceeded the scope of consent when he subsequently opened 
a sealed cardboard box that he found in the back seat because the suspect gave no indication that his 
consent to “‘look’ into the car” included consent to break open the sealed cardboard box); People v. 
Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); State v. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d 677, 682 (Or. Ct. App. 
1996). 
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Baltazar for speeding in a rented U-Haul truck.93 The defendant stated 
that he rented the truck to carry his personal belongings as he had just 
moved to Detroit.94 The officer placed the defendant in his squad car 
while he reviewed his license and rental agreement.95 After reviewing 
the documents, the officer asked the defendant if he could “take a look” 
inside the back of his U-Haul truck.96 Even though the officer never 
gave a reason why he wanted to look in the truck, the defendant agreed 
and the officer’s search ensued.97 During the officer’s search, he 
discovered a number of personal items (couches, dressers, mattresses, 
etc.)—all of which were consistent with the suspect’s story—but three 
sealed cardboard boxes piqued his interest.98 The officer subsequently 
opened the boxes, revealing 188 pounds of cannabis.99 
The Baltazar court held that the officer’s act of opening the 
cardboard boxes exceeded the scope of consent because the defendant 
only agreed to let the officer “take a look” in the back of the U-Haul,100 
and moreover, the officer failed to provide a reason for his more in 
depth search.101 Because the defendant only agreed to allow the officer 
to “take a look” in the back of the U-Haul, the officer’s search was 
limited to looking for what the defendant expressed the truck 
contained—personal belongings.102 Accordingly, for the officer to 
legally open the cardboard boxes—which from the outside provided 
no indication that they contained anything other than personal 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d at 1188. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d at 1188. 
 100. Id. at 1189 (internal quotations omitted). Note that the court decided the case both under the Fourth 
Amendment and the Illinois State Constitution, which has very similar language to the U.S. Constitution. 
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”), with ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (“The people shall have 
the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, 
seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other 
means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 101. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d at 1190. 
 102. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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belongings—he needed to ask the defendant for his express consent to 
search the boxes.103 
Other state courts have taken a similar view regarding the restrictive 
nature of conversational consent searches.104 In an Oregon case, 
Jacobsen, the state Court of Appeals found that an officer exceeded 
the scope of consent when a passenger said he would not mind if the 
officer “look[ed] inside the cab” of his pickup truck, and the officer 
subsequently opened a zipped duffel bag in the back seat, revealing an 
unlawfully possessed firearm.105 The court concluded that, based on 
the conversation, the suspect had authorized “a more general sweep of 
the truck[]” rather than the thorough search that the officer actually 
performed.106 Importantly, and consistent with both Baltazar and 
Jacobsen, a Florida appeals court has stated that “a request to take ‘a 
quick look around’” does not allow “the police to go beyond a plain 
view search.”107 
B.   The Expanded View of Consent 
By and large, the primary view taken by federal courts is that a 
suspect’s consent to a quick look search authorizes the officer to 
perform a full search.108 In these cases, the courts analyze the facts—
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. 
 104. E.g., Jacobs v. State, 733 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Rodriguez v. State, 539 So. 
2d 513, 513–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d 677, 682 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). 
 105. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d at 682 (noting, however, that the defendant did not have an opportunity to 
object to the search of the duffel bag because he was being questioned by another officer away from his 
truck) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant, Jacobsen, argued that the officer’s conduct violated 
both his Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution as well as his rights under the Oregon State 
Constitution. Id. at 679. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV, with OR. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (“No law shall 
violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”). 
 106. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d at 682. 
 107. Jacobs, 733 So. 2d at 555 (stating that “deputies may have exceeded the scope of consent by 
searching . . . clothing in [the suspect’s] closet or [by searching] in . . . other area[s] not in plain view” 
where the suspect gave officers permission to “take ‘a quick look around’”). 
 108. E.g., United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rich, 
992 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp. 
2d 1217, 1225 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding that, where defendant consented to the officer’s request to “‘take 
a look’” in the vehicle defendant was driving, defendant had provided the officer with a general consent 
to search), aff’d, 441 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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which closely mirror the restricted view cases from above—based on 
the same rules and factors as the restricted view cases, yet come out on 
the other side of the issue.109 
1.   Expanded View in the Name of Law Enforcement Efficiency 
In United States v. Rich, a Texas district court held that the evidence 
an officer discovered after he received consent to “look into” 
defendant’s vehicle was inadmissible, but the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals overruled their decision.110 In Rich, an officer made a routine 
traffic stop and proceeded to ask the suspect “if he could look into the 
[truck].”111 The officer made the request three times without receiving 
a response from the suspect and finally demanded that the suspect 
answer his question, to which the suspect responded “yes.”112 The 
officer proceeded to search the vehicle and found a suitcase, which he 
opened, revealing marijuana.113 
The defendant argued that, by unzipping the suitcase found in his 
truck, the officer had exceeded his scope of consent.114 The district 
court found that, even though the officer asked the suspect if he had 
any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle when he first made the stop, 
his subsequent request to “‘have a look in’” the truck did not grant him 
permission to search for drugs or other contraband because he did not 
“expressly or implicitly” ask to look for narcotics when he asked to 
“‘look in’” the vehicle.115 Accordingly, an objective reasonable person 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Compare United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000), with Rich, 992 F.2d at 506. 
 110. United States v. Rich, 791 F. Supp. 1162, 1165, 1170 (W.D. Tex. 1992), rev’d, 992 F.2d 502 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 111. Rich, 992 F.2d at 504. The officer stopped the defendant because the defendant’s truck had a 
broken license plate light. Id. 
 112. Id. The district court noted that “the repeated requests to ‘look in’ the defendant’s car . . . tend[ed] 
to demonstrate coercion by the trooper, as well as the statement during the third request that the trooper 
needed a yes or no answer.” Rich, 791 F. Supp. at 1165. 
 113. Rich, 992 F.2d at 504. 
 114. Id. at 505. 
 115. Rich, 791 F. Supp. at 1166–67. Accordingly, since “the scope of a search is generally defined by 
its expressed object[,]” the officer did not receive authorization to open closed containers—like the 
suitcase—when he simply asked to “‘look into the truck.’” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); 
Rich, 791 F. Supp. at 1165. The court also noted that the officer could “easily have asked [for] the 
defendant’s permission to search for drugs” or “to search the contents of the suitcase.” Rich, 791 F. Supp. 
at 1167. 
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would not have believed the suspect’s scope of consent extended to the 
suitcase in the back seat.116 
The Texas district court’s decision and rationale parallel the 
interpretation of similar language in Wald and the other state court 
cases previously discussed.117 However, the court of appeals reversed, 
finding that a reasonable person would have understood defendant’s 
consent to include the inside of the vehicle and the inside of any 
containers located therein.118 
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling for two 
primary reasons.119 First, the court stated that the entire conversation 
between the officer and defendant—from stop to arrest—lasted 
approximately five minutes, and based on the officer’s prior 
statements, the defendant probably knew the officer wanted to search 
for narcotics.120 Secondly, the court addressed the specific meaning of 
the “look into” language.121 The defendant argued that the officer’s 
request to look into the vehicle was a request to “see inside” the 
vehicle.122 In support of his argument, he pointed out that the officer 
had previously tried to see inside the vehicle but could not due to its 
tinted windows.123 Importantly, the court noted that it “decline[d] the 
defendant’s invitation to establish a list of specific terms from which 
an officer must select . . . for each individual situation and/or 
defendant” as it would “hamper” the duties of law enforcement 
officers and contrast with the Fourth Amendment principle of 
reasonableness.124 The court noted that several other circuits had 
adopted a rule that conversational requests for consent provided the 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Rich, 791 F. Supp. at 1166. 
 117. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 118. Rich, 992 F.2d at 508. 
 119. See id. at 506–08. 
 120. Id. at 506–07. The defendant also argued that he did not have the opportunity to object to the search 
or limit his consent because things happened so quickly. Id. at 507. The court rejected this argument, 
stating that the defendant could have limited his consent when he first authorized the search to only what 
was in plain view. Id. 
 121. Id. at 506. 
 122. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Rich, 992 F.2d at 506. 
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equivalent of a full request to search,125 and the Fifth Circuit decided 
to follow their lead in this case.126 
2.   Expanded View Based on Failure to Object 
Many of the expanded view cases are directly at odds with Wald.127 
While Wald viewed a defendant’s failure to object as a moot point 
unless the defendant originally gave the officer a general authorization 
to search, the expanded view cases place much more emphasis on the 
defendant’s failure to object.128 In United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
two individuals, Rene and Santiago, stopped at a gas station, and while 
inside, Rene “talked casually” with a police officer.129 Upon leaving, 
the officer asked Rene if they had any drugs in their car, and when 
Rene responded “‘no[,]’” the officer asked: “‘Do you care if I look and 
see?’”130 Santiago responded “‘[g]o ahead’” but added that the officer 
“‘don’t got no right.’”131 The officer stated that, since they agreed that 
he could look, he was “‘going to go ahead and look real quick.’”132 
The “real quick” search lasted about thirty minutes, included a drug 
sniffing dog, and subsequently revealed three pounds of heroin.133 The 
court found that, even though the search lasted so long, the search still 
fell within the defendant’s scope of consent.134 The court reasoned that 
                                                                                                                 
 125. E.g., United States v. Harris, 716 F. Supp. 1470, 1472 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that a request to 
“look in” granted a general right to search), aff’d, 928 F.2d 1113 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892–93 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that a request to “‘look through’” is not so 
vague as to provide a limited right to search). 
 126. Rich, 992 F.2d at 506 (“We take this opportunity to establish a similar rule for our own circuit: it 
is not necessary for an officer specifically to use the term ‘search’ when he requests consent from an 
individual to search a vehicle. We hold that any words, when viewed in context, that objectively 
communicate to a reasonable individual that the officer is requesting permission to examine the vehicle 
and its contents constitute a valid search request for Fourth Amendment purposes.”). 
 127. E.g., United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding officer’s search within 
the scope of consent where suspect allowed the officer to take a “‘quick look’” through his bags and failed 
to object to the search); Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 892 (“Failure to object to the continuation of the search 
under these circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was within the scope of the 
consent.”). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 868–69 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 129. Id. at 863. 
 130. Id. at 864. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d at 868–69; see also United States v. Alcantar, 271 F.3d 731, 738 (8th 
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both individuals “‘express[ed] no concern’” during the course of the 
search and at no time did they “‘attempt to retract or narrow’” 
consent.135 Thus, their failure to object to the search showed that it fell 
within their scope of consent.136 
Lopez-Mendoza represents just one of the many expanded view 
cases that hold based on the suspect’s failure to object. In United States 
v. Espinosa, the court found that an officer’s search was within the 
suspect’s scope of consent where—during the fourteen minute 
search—the defendant “stood beside his car expressing no concern 
during [the] thorough and systematic search” and did not “attempt to 
retract or narrow his consent.”137 In United States v. Porter, the court 
found the search was “well within the scope of [defendant’s] consent” 
where he “could have withdrawn his consent at any time” throughout 
the course of the search but “failed to do so.”138 
As was the case in Rich, some expanded view cases rule that the 
conversational requests for consent grant a general authorization to 
search in the interest of law enforcement efficiency, while others base 
their decision on a view opposite from that taken in Wald—that a 
defendant’s failure to object coupled with minimal corroborating 
evidence are enough to show that the search fell within the defendant’s 
scope of consent.139 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 2001) (holding that at least the first hour of a search was within the scope of consent where neither 
suspects “object[ed] to the length of the search” at any point). 
 135. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d at 868. 
 136. Id. at 868–69. 
 137. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 138. United States v. Porter, 49 F. App’x 438, 443 (4th Cir. 2002). These are just a couple of the many 
examples construing a defendant’s failure to object to a search as consent to an officer’s full-blown search. 
 139. United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We decline the defendant’s invitation 
to establish a list of specific terms from which an officer must select the most appropriate for each 
individual situation and/or defendant. To so hamper law enforcement officials in their everyday duties 
would be an unjustifiable extension of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be 
‘reasonable.’”); Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 892 (“Failure to object to the continuation of the search under these 
circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was within the scope of the consent.”). 
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III.   THE FUTURE OF CONSENT LAW: A NEW STANDARD FOR 
SHOWING VOLUNTARY CONSENT IN QUICK LOOK SEARCH CASES 
As quick look and other conversational consent cases have 
permeated through courts since Schneckloth, courts have proposed a 
wide range of solutions to address the various issues associated with 
consent searches.140 It is important to consider the proposed changes 
to the consent doctrine in general as they would have a direct impact 
on the law governing conversational consent searches and present 
viable solutions to the problems associated with conversational 
consent searches. The more popular propositions include the use of 
consent forms by police,141 changes initiated at a state court level,142 
changes in police procedures,143 and even abolishing the consent 
doctrine altogether.144 In this section I will analyze the effect of some 
of these proposed solutions to conversational consent search issues and 
suggest courts adopt the restricted Wald view in conversational 
consent cases absent a suspect’s subjective knowledge of the scope of 
an officer’s search.145 
A.   Informed Consent and the Widespread Use of Consent Forms 
The fact that suspects do not exactly know what they are consenting 
to when they respond to a request to search is one of the many 
                                                                                                                 
 140. E.g., Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1192–93 (proposing that courts adopt a doctrine of informed 
consent, similar to the standard in the medical field, in Fourth Amendment cases); Tracey Maclin, The 
Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 80 (2008) 
(“[W]henever a person objects or refuses to provide consent . . . that refusal should bar further attempts 
by the police to seek consent. Furthermore, a refusal to sign a written consent form should also operate 
retroactively to invalidate an earlier oral consent.”); Arthur J. Park, Automobile Consent Searches: The 
Driver’s Options in a Lose-Lose Situation, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 461, 474–77 (advocating for state 
level changes to the consent doctrine and explaining the advantages of overruling the Schneckloth case); 
Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 191–92 (1991) 
(arguing that courts should only find valid consent where a suspect’s consent is in “response to a specific 
and narrow request” to search by the officer); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 211, 258–71 (2002) (suggesting that the consent doctrine be eliminated altogether). 
 141. Strauss, supra note 140, at 255. 
 142. Park, supra note 140, at 474–76. 
 143. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 191–92. 
 144. Strauss, supra note 140, at 258–71. 
 145. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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problems associated with consent searches.146 This problem is 
compounded in conversational consent searches where the officer does 
not clearly indicate he is requesting a suspect’s consent to search.147 
As a result, some have proposed that courts adopt the doctrine of 
informed consent from the medical context in Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure cases.148 This suggestion seeks to safeguard the 
“ignorant” suspect from consenting to something that he does not fully 
understand.149 In the medical surgery context, informed consent 
“consists of an absolute duty imposed by law on physicians to inform 
the patient of the nature of the surgery, the probable consequences, the 
risks and hazards of the procedure, and the anticipated benefits before 
obtaining the patient’s consent.”150 In his article, Professor Lassiter 
suggests that the informed consent standard for physicians “makes 
sense” and should be “no less applicable” in the Fourth Amendment 
context.151 
This approach, which would effectively overrule the holding in 
Schneckloth,152 has great merit in the conversational consent search 
case. By requiring individuals to know “the nature . . . the probable 
consequences, the risks and hazards . . . and the [] benefits” of a search 
prior to obtaining consent, suspects are able to make an informed 
decision about whether they want to provide an officer with consent to 
search.153 Specifically, this solution would help address one of the 
                                                                                                                 
 146. This proposition, while not typically stated outright, is clear from the very fact that suspects argue 
that the officer exceeded their scope of consent. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 
663, 667 (5th Cir. 2003) (addressing suspect’s argument that the officer exceeded his scope of consent). 
The very fact that defendants argue an officer exceeded their scope of consent so often shows that 
defendants are not really sure what they are consenting to. 
 147. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228. In some cases the officer makes it abundantly clear he is seeking consent 
to perform a full search. See United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 515, 517 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
the officer asked the suspect “if she would consent to a search” then subsequently presented her with a 
consent form, which the suspect signed indicating that she “‘freely consent[ed]’” to the search). In 
conversational or quick look cases sometimes the request is not so clear as to alert the suspect that the 
officer is seeking the consent to perform a full-blown search. Wald, 216 F.3d at 1228 (noting that an 
officer addressed the suspect by stating: “‘You wouldn’t mind if I take a quick look, would you?’”). 
 148. Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1193. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1192. 
 151. Id. at 1192–93. 
 152. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (holding that individuals need not know 
that they have a right to refuse consent for their consent to be valid). 
 153. Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1192. 
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss4/7
2014] THE CONVERSATIONAL CONSENT SEARCH 1101 
primary issues in conversational consent searches—that individuals do 
not know they may be providing an officer with consent to perform a 
full search when agreeing to a conversational statement like “‘would 
you mind if I look inside the cab[?]’”154 
Moreover, the aims of the informed consent doctrine would likely 
be furthered through the widespread use of consent forms by law 
enforcement officers. Officers would still have to inform a suspect of 
the consequences, risks, and benefits of consenting to a search but 
would additionally require suspects to sign a form confirming that the 
suspect had been informed of their rights. For example, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency has used a consent form titled “CONSENT TO 
SEARCH,” which provides: “1. I have been asked to permit special 
agents of the drug enforcement administration to search . . . 2. I have 
not been threatened nor forced in any way. 3. I freely consent to this 
search.”155 
Typically when these forms are used in other contexts, the officer 
requires the suspect to read the form and then reads the form back to 
the suspect, asking if the suspect has any questions periodically 
throughout the reading.156 As with informed consent, requiring 
suspects to sign a consent form would ensure that they have actually 
been informed of their rights and options concerning consent to search, 
and it also confirms their knowledge in writing.157 This additional 
writing requirement would further alleviate the confusion that goes 
along with a conversational consent search. 
While critics of informed consent and consent forms might point out 
that a large number of search and seizure cases involve non-native 
English speakers,158 at least some law enforcement agencies have 
                                                                                                                 
 154. State v. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d 677, 682 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). 
 155. United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 517 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration 
in original). 
 156. E.g., United States v. Nikzad, 739 F.2d 1431, 1432 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Agent Marcello gave Nikzad 
a DEA Consent to Search form and asked him to read it. Nikzad appeared to do so. Marcello then read 
the form aloud to Nikzad, and asked after each line if Nikzad had any questions.”). 
 157. Other articles regarding consent have suggested that, in order for consent to be valid, it must be in 
writing. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 192 (“Consent should be in writing—either a warrant or consent 
form would suffice.”). 
 158. A 2007 study by the U.S. Census Bureau indicated that almost 20% of households in the U.S. 
primarily spoke a language other than English in the home. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE IN 
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already addressed this problem.159 For example, as of the end of 2011 
the New York Police Department used consent to search forms in 
seven different languages and also employed a service known as 
“Language Line,” which enables officers to make a phone call at any 
time if they need a translator.160 Accordingly, adopting informed 
consent and the use of consent forms might produce favorable results 
in the conversational consent search field even in light of some 
challenges such as a language barrier. 
Logically, these solutions would have the positive effect of 
decreasing the number of consent searches performed by officers as 
individuals would realize that they have a right to refuse consent. 
However, in practice this might not be the case. Notably, the coercive 
nature of police searches would still be an issue if courts required 
informed consent or consent forms because the same underlying cause 
of coercion, the environment in which the search occurs, would still be 
present.161 Additionally, while “many [police] departments currently 
require or encourage their officers to tell suspects of their right not to 
consent before obtaining consent to search[,]” there is at least some 
suggestion that this does not have a significant impact on the number 
of consent searches suspects agree to.162 
While no one can precisely predict the outcome of implementing an 
informed consent policy, a suspect’s knowledge of his rights in similar 
contexts has proved to have an unappreciable impact on the number of 
suspects who forego those rights. Take for example the Miranda 
                                                                                                                 
THE UNITED STATES: 2007 1 (2010), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acs-12.pdf. The 
study also noted, “the population speaking a language other than English at home has increased steadily 
for the last three decades.” Id. 
 159. E.g., Rocco Parascandola, ‘Consent to Search’ Forms, Now Available in Seven Languages, Allow 
Police to Bypass Warrant Process, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2011, 4:00 AM), http:www.nydailynews. 
com/news/crime/consent-search-forms-languages-police-bypass-warrant-process-article-1.962160. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Strauss, supra note 140, at 254. If law required the use of consent forms or informed consent the 
coercion problem would still exist because “police officers [would be] providing the information in the 
same coercive environment that existed before.” Id. 
 162. Id. The Strauss article mentions that in the Miranda warning context 80–90% of suspects still 
waived their rights even when they had knowledge of the right to refuse. Id. at 254 n.154. While the 
Miranda and consent contexts are vastly different, this at least shows that knowledge of the right to refuse 
may not be as powerful as logic would suggest. 
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warning.163 If you have seen an episode of Law & Order or Matlock or 
any one of the thousands of police and legal based television dramas, 
you can likely recite some form of the Miranda warning: “You have 
the right to remain silent . . . Anything you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law” and so on.164 While one would think that 
a Miranda warning would impact the number of people who chose to 
talk to police after receiving the warning, “the overwhelming majority 
of suspects waive their rights and agree to talk to the police without 
the assistance of counsel.”165 In fact, studies suggest that somewhere 
between 78% and 96% of suspects waive their rights166 and that more 
than ten times as many suspects waived their Miranda rights as 
invoked their rights.167 No evidence suggests that the outcome would 
be appreciably different if courts required a similar warning in the 
consent context. Thus, while the doctrine of informed consent and the 
use of consent forms might seem like they go a long way toward 
improving conversational consent search issues, there is at least some 
suggestion that this may not provide the most effective solution to the 
problem. 
B.   Encouraging Change by State Legislature and Local Law 
Enforcement 
As states are often better positioned to make tailored improvements 
for the particular needs of their citizens, some have proposed that state 
action168 or changes to local law enforcement practices169 are the 
solution to the problems raised by consent searches. While 
Schneckloth and other federal cases dealing with consent control state 
courts insofar as they analyze issues under the Fourth Amendment, 
                                                                                                                 
 163. The Miranda warning spawned from the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). 
 164. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 374–75 (2010). 
 165. Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 375, 379–80 (2011). 
 166. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 1000, 1012 (2001). 
 167. George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1976 (2004). 
 168. Park, supra note 140, at 474–76. 
 169. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 191–92. 
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“each state has the power to impose higher standards on searches and 
seizures under state law than is required by the Federal 
Constitution.”170 Accordingly, some state courts have taken up the 
issue and provided that a higher standard—for example, a suspect’s 
actual knowledge of the right to refuse consent—is required to obtain 
valid consent.171 While changes on a state level would likely be more 
tailored to the individual needs of their citizens, changes are unlikely 
to come anytime soon as evidenced by the very limited number of 
states that have addressed the issue over the past four decades.172 
Likewise, local law enforcement agencies could change their 
practices. Ideally, departments across the country would adopt 
“specific controls,” which aim to improve the problems associated 
with consent searches by changing the way officers seek consent from 
suspects.173 For instance, rather than asking vague, conversational 
questions in an effort to obtain consent, police departments could adopt 
a clear phrase that officers use whenever they seek consent from a 
                                                                                                                 
 170. State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67 (N.J. 1975) (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)). 
 171. Id. at 68 (“[W]here the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden of 
showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent.”); see also Park, supra note 140, at 475–76 (“In Minnesota, the prosecution’s claim of voluntary 
consent in the routine traffic stop context is subject to ‘careful appellate review’ due to the ability to pull 
over virtually anyone, the ‘enormous discretion in enforcing traffic laws,’ and the inherently coercive 
nature of a traffic stop. In South Dakota, the state must prove the voluntariness of consent by clear and 
convincing evidence.” (footnote omitted) (citing State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579–80 (Minn. 1997); 
State v. Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d 477, 478 (S.D. 1991))). These cases seem to be consistent with the former 
view taken by courts that consent to search was effectively a waiver of a constitutional right. Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (emphasizing the fact that an individual needs to know that he is 
giving up a legal right in order to waive it). 
 172. See, e.g., George, 557 N.W.2d at 579–80; Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d. 547, 558 (Miss. 1983); 
Johnson, 346 A.2d at 68; Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d at 478. 
 173. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 192. In his note, Rotenberg illustrates a few different ideas of 
“specific controls” that might be effective: 
 
1) A minimum standard should be met, whether with or without a warrant, before consent 
may be sought—the standard could be a blend of need and level of belief, e.g., “reasonable 
need and suspicion.” 2) The context of consent should be limited, e.g., to residences. 
Automobiles are deserving of greater protection from police searches than they currently 
receive, and containers because of their variety in type and context should not be 
considered a single category. 3) Consent to search should not be extended to include 
consent to seize; probable cause should be required. 4) Third party consent given in 
response to a police officer’s request to search the privacy interests of another should not 
be valid. 5) Consent should be in writing—either a warrant or consent form would suffice. 
 
Id. 
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suspect that indicates they are seeking consent to search a clearly 
defined and tailored area. For example, if an officer would like to 
search the trunk of a suspect’s vehicle during a traffic stop, the officer 
could pose the following question to the suspect: “Do you consent to 
me performing a full search of the trunk of your car, which could 
include examination of any open or closed container therein?” In the 
case that both the officer and the suspect speak English, it would be 
very hard for a defendant to argue that he did not understand that he 
was consenting to a search or that the officer exceeded his scope of 
consent by removing a speaker in the trunk—as was the case in 
Wald.174 In addition to adopting a standard request for consent 
question, officers could be required to ask for a suspect’s consent in 
every new area in which they intend to search. This requirement would 
ensure that the officer never exceeds the scope of the suspect’s consent 
even when he moves from the trunk to the passenger area of the 
vehicle—as was the case in Chaidez.175 
While the examples above clearly do not exhaust the list of potential 
changes police departments could make, changes of this type would 
go a long way in improving the issues with conversational consent 
searches. This solution, unlike others, would not overrule the 
foundations of consent jurisprudence such as Schneckloth but would 
still be an admirable step towards alleviating the problems with 
conversational consent searches. 
However, action at the local law enforcement level has its 
drawbacks as well. Even though the issues with conversational consent 
searches stem from police departments themselves—it is in fact the 
officers who ask to take a quick look in the first place—getting 
departments to change their conduct on a national basis is easier said 
than done. “[P]olice procedures are generally determined on the local 
level” and implementing an across the board change would require an 
enormous number of “independent decisions” by local law 
enforcement agencies; a feat not easily achieved.176 Not to mention, 
                                                                                                                 
 174. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 175. United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 382 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 176. Park, supra note 140, at 474. 
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police departments likely would not readily adopt a policy that might 
“hamper” one of their most effective law enforcement tools.177 
C.   Abolishing Consent 
As many proposed solutions to consent law in general, such as those 
listed above, all have fairly substantial drawbacks; many authors have 
advocated for the drastic solution that courts abolish the voluntary 
consent doctrine altogether.178 One of the foremost advocates of 
abolishing the consent exception, Professor Marcy Strauss, noted that 
courts have justified the use of consent searches on two main grounds: 
“First, consent searches promote the interests of law enforcement. 
Second, individuals may benefit from voluntary consent, and in any 
event should have the right to decide whether they want to allow the 
police to engage in a search.”179 
Strauss goes on to discredit these two arguments.180 In response to 
the police efficiency argument, Strauss notes that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence showing that consent searches are necessary or that 
they vastly improve efficiency of the police.181 While this may be true, 
it is hard to argue that consent searches do not provide a benefit to our 
nation’s police officers. As stated previously, voluntary consent 
searches provide officers with “the depth and breadth of the search” 
that they want.182 Without the consent search, law enforcement officers 
would have to resort to other options such as obtaining a warrant or 
conducting thorough investigations that could potentially lead 
nowhere at the cost of precious law enforcement resources. 
In response to the individual benefit and right to choose 
justification, Strauss states that individuals likely do not receive any 
                                                                                                                 
 177. United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 178. E.g., Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 192 (“If upgrading the consent search by modifying police 
practices or individual consent or both proves unsatisfactory, then the obvious alternative is to abolish the 
consent search altogether.”); Strauss, supra note 140, at 271 (“The power imbalance, the likelihood of 
coercion, and the difficulty in assessing the voluntariness of the situation all weigh in favor of a per se 
ban on consent.”). 
 179. Strauss, supra note 140, at 258–59. 
 180. Id. at 260, 268. 
 181. Id. at 260. 
 182. Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172. 
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benefit from consenting to a search because without consent the officer 
will likely have to leave the individual alone and with the consent—
assuming the individual does not have any illegal contraband—the 
police have to leave him alone anyway.183 In this instance, Strauss has 
considerable merit in her argument. However, when weighed against 
the benefit officers likely receive from consent searches, even with the 
lack of empirical evidence, the scales tip in favor of the availability of 
a consent exception to the warrant requirement. 
D.   Proposed Solution to the Conversational Consent Issue 
The solutions outlined above all provide at least a marginal benefit 
in the conversational consent search context; however, all of the 
solutions come with significant drawbacks. Therefore, courts should 
adopt the restrictive view taken in Wald and in a variety of state courts; 
consent to a conversational or quick look search provides the officer 
with a limited authorization to search.184 As courts begin to exclude 
evidence found in response to a suspect’s consent to a quick look 
search request—evidence that typically forms the basis of the charge 
against the defendant—law enforcement agencies will be persuaded to 
change their practices, effectively eliminating the use of 
conversational requests to search and the unique issues they present to 
consent searches in general. 
By adopting this rule, courts would need to clearly define what 
constitutes a quick look or conversational consent search. In the 
interest of promoting educated decisions by suspects, courts should 
consider any request in which an officer does not clearly indicate that 
he is seeking consent to search and any request that is not “specific and 
narrow”185 as a conversational request to search. While this rule might 
seem unduly restrictive to officers on its face, enforcement officials 
still have a wide variety of tools at their disposal to get “the depth and 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Strauss, supra note 140, at 266–67. 
 184. E.g., United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000); Jacobs v. State, 733 So. 2d 
552, 555–56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Baltazar, 691 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); 
State v. Jacobsen, 922 P.2d 677, 682 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). 
 185. Rotenberg, supra note 140, at 192. 
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breadth of the search” that they want.186 If courts adopted this rule, 
many of the other solutions proposed above would likely come to 
fruition. 
By adopting this rule, courts would still advance the overall purpose 
of consent searches—promoting law enforcement efficiency187—
while not imposing a substantial burden on an individual’s 
constitutional rights. Additionally, this rule leaves the foundations of 
consent law unscathed, as it does not have any considerable impact on 
the decisions set forth in Schneckloth,188 Jimeno,189 or Rodriguez.190 
Overall, adopting a restricted view in conversational consent cases 
strikes the appropriate balance between police efficiency and retaining 
individual liberties. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the vast expansion of police power over the last few 
decades, it has become increasingly important for courts to limit the 
power that the government can exert over U.S. citizens. Since courts 
began to recognize the voluntary consent exception to the warrant 
requirement in 1946,191 it has been used increasingly by police forces 
as an “eas[y]” and efficient means of obtaining “the depth and breadth 
of the search” they want.192 However, police have begun to disguise 
their requests to search in conversational questions like: “Can I take a 
quick look?”193 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172. 
 187. Strauss, supra note 140, at 258–59. 
 188. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the 
sine qua non of an effective consent.”). 
 189. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) (“A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the 
scope of the search to which he consents.”). 
 190. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (holding in part that the “determination of 
consent . . . must ‘be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment . . . “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief”’ that the consenting party had authority 
over the premises?” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968))). 
 191. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947) (per curiam). 
 192. See Lassiter, supra note 29, at 1172. 
 193. E.g., United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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In addition to the issues present in consent cases—such as whether 
consent was actually voluntarily given—conversational consent cases 
present the unique problem that individuals may not even know that 
they are consenting to a full search of their vehicle or property. In light 
of this, a minority of both state and federal courts have held that 
consent to a conversational request to search only grants the officer a 
limited authorization to search194 while the majority of courts have 
held that it provides the officer with the ability to perform a full-blown 
search.195 
In considering the various solutions to the conversational or quick 
look search, it is important to weigh the balance between law 
enforcement efficiency—an important consideration in light of the 
serious safety concerns facing the country—and the preservation of 
civil liberties and individual rights. With this balance in mind, courts 
should adopt the restricted view of the scope of consent granted in 
conversational consent cases. This rule, while consistent with the 
historical foundations of consent law, will require officers around the 
country to change their practices in a manner that would be 
significantly more beneficial to individuals and the criminal justice 
system as a whole. 
	  
                                                                                                                 
 194. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 195. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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